The spatial factor derives from the fundamentally and
deliberately asymmetrical nature of Nazi rule in Europe. Between the two
extreme ends of the timescale on which Nazi planners projected their
program—the immediate strategic contingencies of battle and the ultimate
ideological goals of transforming the European continent in an imperial order
destined to last one thousand years—there was an almost infinite latitude for
experimentation, provisional solutions, and a very peculiar management of
priorities, of a military, economic, or ideological nature.
Southeastern Europe, particularly the Balkans, form a second
area with a distinct fate. The German invasion responded to the strategic
imperative to occupy the northern shore of the Mediterranean in order to avoid
a British landing rather than the implementation of any precise planning or
ideological design. The winter famine in Greece in 1941 and 1942, for example,
was the result of cynical neglect and contempt for the lives of the local
population and not of any deliberate calculation. In Yugoslavia in particular,
a country that had verged on civil war ever since its creation after World War
I, extreme brutality against the civilian population combined with murderously
divisive occupation policies, as practiced by the German, Italian, and
Hungarian occupiers, exacerbating tensions among Serbs, Croats, Bosnian
Muslims, Slovenes, ethnic Hungarians, ethnic Germans, Jews, and Gypsies,
degenerated into generalized internecine killing. The creation of a Croat
fascist—Ustas¡a—State and the annexation policies in other areas were
particularly nefarious in this regard.
In this context of anarchy, the tiny prewar communist
parties emerged as the most efficient and credible endogenous force. Partisan
republics, organizing the redistribution of land and capable of halting ethnic
violence, both by offering an alternative political creed and by ruthlessly
eliminating its nationalist adversaries, established the only homegrown communist
regimes in Europe outside the Soviet Union, in Albania and Yugoslavia. In
Greece only the intervention of twenty-two thousand British troops could avert
a similar scenario. Unlike postwar France, Italy, or the German Democratic
Republic, which would rhetorically proclaim to be political regimes born from
resistance struggle, the Albanian and Yugoslav communist parties effectively
transformed a clandestine underground apparatus into a new ruling elite, with
all the problems this entailed. By 1957 Milovan Djilas, himself a partisan
hero, would describe in The New Class how a regime built on this historical
legitimacy was hermetically closed to the younger generations and fundamentally
frozen in its evolution.
A last important chronological distinction applies to the
‘‘end’’ of resistance. For Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic countries,
anti-Soviet partisan activity continued into the late 1940s. For parts of
central and eastern Europe, particularly for the Balkans, including Greece,
1945 is not the end of the cycle of civil war, ethnic cleansing, expropriation,
and political violence. The second half of the decade from 1938 to 1948 is in
that regard often more fundamental than the five years up to 1943.
The early engagement of nationalists in the resistance,
during the fall of 1939 in Poland; the summer of 1940 in Norway, the
Netherlands, and Belgium; from April 1941 in Serbia and Greece; followed by the
simultaneous entry of communist militants all over occupied Europe in June and
July of 1941. A broadening of the basis occurred late in 1942 and in the course
of 1943, particularly through the dynamic of ‘‘functional’’ resistance
involving resisters with a very different profile. In late 1943 and during
1944, the expectation of a German retreat then created space either for a
process of unification of a national resistance front anticipating the
formation of a new postwar political coalition, such as in most western
European countries, or a situation of civil war in the absence of prospects for
coalition and power-sharing, such as in eastern and southern Europe. Resistance
is thus a central category in understanding the war experience and postwar
trajectory of European societies, but one whose impact has to be measured
carefully in political, social, and even cultural terms depending on the
geographical and chronological setting, and it is furthermore necessary to
distinguish between the different forms of engagement in the struggle against
it.
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