The Bombing of Sofia in World War II, 1944.
The modern aerial bomb, with its distinctive elongated
shape, stabilizing fins, and nose-fitted detonator, is a Bulgarian invention.
In the Balkan War of 1912, waged by Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro
(the Balkan League) against Turkey, a Bulgarian army captain, Simeon Petrov,
adapted and enlarged a number of grenades for use from an airplane. They were
dropped on a Turkish railway station on October 16, 1912, from an Albatros F.2
biplane piloted by Radul Milkov. Petrov afterward modified the design by adding
a stabilizing tail and a fuse designed to detonate on impact, and the six-kilogram
bomb became the standard Bulgarian issue until 1918. The plans of the so-called
Chataldzha bomb were later passed on to Germany, Bulgaria’s ally during the
First World War. The design, or something like it, soon became standard issue
in all the world’s first air forces.
Petrov’s invention came back to haunt Bulgaria during the
Second World War. On November 14, 1943, a force of ninety-one American B-25
Mitchell bombers escorted by forty-nine P-38 Lightning fighters attacked the
marshaling yards in the Bulgarian capital, Sofia. The bombing was spread over a
wide area, including three villages. The raid destroyed some of the rail
system, the Vrajedna airfield, and a further 187 buildings, resulting in around
150 casualties. A second attack ten days later by B-24 Liberator bombers was
less successful. There was poor weather across southern Bulgaria, and only
seventeen of the force reached what they hoped was Sofia and bombed through
cloud, hitting another seven villages around the capital. The attacks were enough
to spread panic through the city. In the absence of effective air defenses or
civil defense measures, thousands fled to the surrounding area. The Royal
Bulgarian Air Force, though equipped with sixteen Messerschmitt Me109G fighters
supplied by Bulgaria’s ally Germany, could do little against raids that, though
not entirely unexpected, came as a complete surprise when they happened.
The raid in November 1943 was not the first attack on a
Bulgarian target during the war, though it was the heaviest and most
destructive so far. Bulgaria became a target only because of the decision taken
in March 1941 by the Bulgarian government, after much hesitation, to tie the
country to Germany by signing the Tripartite Pact, which had been made among
the principal Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, the previous September.
When in the spring of 1941 German forces were based in Bulgaria to attack
Greece and Yugoslavia, the RAF sent a force of six Wellington bombers to bomb
the Sofia rail links in order to hamper the concentration of German troops. A
British night raid on April 13 made a lucky hit on an ammunition train, causing
major fires and widespread destruction.
Further small raids occurred on July 23
and August 11, 1941, which the Bulgarian government blamed on the Soviet air
force. Although Bulgaria did not actively participate in the Axis invasion of
the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, it gave supplies to Germany and allowed
German ships to use the major ports of Varna and Burgas. On September 13, 1942,
a further small Soviet raid hit Burgas, where German ships laden with
oil-drilling equipment were awaiting the signal to cross the Black Sea to
supply German engineers with the materials they would need to restart
production once the Caucasus oilfields had been captured. The Soviet Union was
not at war with Bulgaria and denied the intrusions in 1941 and 1942, for which
it was almost certainly responsible, but the attacks were of such small scale
that the Bulgarian government did not insist on reparations.
The handful of pinprick attacks in 1941 and 1942 were enough
to make Bulgaria anxious about what might happen if the Allies ever did decide
to bomb its cities heavily. Bulgaria’s position in the Second World War was an
ambiguous one. The tsar, Boris III, did not want his country to be actively
engaged in fighting a war after the heavy territorial and financial losses
Bulgaria had sustained in the peace settlement of 1919 as punishment for
joining with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the First World War. Only with great
reluctance and under German pressure did the Prime Minister, Bogdan Filov,
declare war on Britain and the United States on December 13, 1941. Aware of
Bulgaria’s vulnerability, the government and the tsar wanted to avoid an actual
state of belligerence with the Western powers, just as the country had refused
to declare war on the Soviet Union. Bulgaria’s small armed forces therefore
undertook no operations against the Allies; instead they were used by the
Germans as occupation troops in Macedonia and Thrace, territories given to
Bulgaria after the German defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941. By 1943 it
was evident to the Bulgarian government and people that they had once again
backed the wrong side. Much of the population was anti-German and some of it
pro-Soviet. In 1942 a left-wing Fatherland Front had been formed, demanding an
end to the war and the severing of links with Germany. Partisan movements in
the occupied territories and in Bulgaria itself became more active during 1943,
and in August of that year they launched a major recruitment drive. The
partisans were chiefly communist and campaigned not only for an end to the war
but for a new social order and closer ties with the Soviet Union. In May 1943
and again in October, Filov authorized contacts with the Western Allies to see
whether there was a possibility of reaching an agreement. He was told that only
unconditional surrender and the evacuation of the occupied territories could be
accepted.
It is against this background that sense can be made of the
Allied decision to launch a series of heavy air attacks on Bulgarian cities.
Knowing that Bulgaria was facing a mounting crisis, caught between its German
ally and the growing threat of a likely Soviet victory, Allied leaders were
encouraged to use bombing as a political tool in the hope that it might produce
a quick dividend by forcing Bulgaria out of the war. The idea that bombing was
capable of a sudden decisive blow by demoralizing a population and causing a
government crisis had been at the heart of much interwar thinking about the use
of airpower. It was the logic of the most famous statement of this principle,
made in 1921 by the Italian general Giulio Douhet in his classic study The
Command of the Air (Il dominio dell’aria). The principle was also a central
element in the view of airpower held by the British Prime Minister, Winston
Churchill, who had previously applied it to both Germany and Italy. It was not
by chance that in a meeting with the British chiefs of staff on October 19,
1943, it was Churchill who would suggest that in his view the Bulgarians were a
“peccant people to whom a sharp lesson should be administered.” Their fault was
to have sided once again with the Germans despite, Churchill claimed, his
efforts to get them to see sense. Bombing was designed to undo the cord that
bound Bulgaria to her German patron.
The sharp lesson was to be a heavy bombing attack on Sofia.
Churchill justified the operation on political grounds: “Experience shows,” he
told the meeting, “that the effect of bombing a country where there were
antagonistic elements was not to unite those elements, but rather to increase
the anger of the anti-war party.” Others present, including Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal, chief of the air staff, and the chief of the imperial
general staff, General Alan Brooke, were less keen and insisted that leaflets
should be dropped along with the bombs explaining that the Allies wanted
Bulgaria to withdraw its occupation troops and surrender (in the end leaflets
were dropped with the curious headline “This is not about Allied terror, but
about Bulgarian insanity”). But the idea of a “sharp lesson” quickly
circulated. The American military chiefs thought that Sofia was so low a
military priority that an attack was scarcely justified, but they were
impressed by the possible “great psychological effect.” Both the British and
American ambassadors in Ankara urged an attack so as to interrupt Turkish-German
commercial rail traffic. On October 24 the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff
directed General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander in the Mediterranean,
to give such a lesson as soon as this was operationally practical. The Turkish
government approved, hopeful perhaps despite neutrality to profit from
Bulgaria’s discomfiture in any postwar settlement.
Churchill wanted Stalin’s
say-so as well, because Bulgaria was clearly in the Soviet sphere of interest,
and on October 29 the British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, who was in Moscow
for negotiations, was able to report back Stalin’s comment that Sofia should
certainly be bombed, as it was nothing more than “a province of Germany.”
The Bulgarian government had expected bombing for some time.
While the regime struggled to come to terms with internal dissent, the Soviet
presence in the east, and Allied demands for unconditional surrender, it also
sought ways to appease the Germans in case they decided to occupy Bulgaria. In
the course of 1943 the deportation of Jews from the occupied areas of Thrace
was completed, and despite the hostility of the tsar, the German authorities in
Sofia persuaded the Bulgarian government to deport native Bulgarian Jews as
well. It was agreed that they would first be transferred to twenty small towns
in the hinterland around Sofia, and in May 1943 some 16,000 Jews were taken at
short notice from the capital and parceled out among eight provinces. The Filov
government linked the Jewish policy with bombing. When the Swiss ambassador
asked Filov on humanitarian grounds to stop sending Thracian Jews to Auschwitz,
Filov retorted that talk of humanity was misconceived when the Allies were busy
obliterating the cities of Europe from the air. Moreover, when he failed to
take up a British offer in February 1943 to transport 4,500 Jewish children
from Bulgaria to Palestine, he feared that Sofia might be bombed in
retaliation. Once the Jews of Sofia had been deported to the provinces, anxiety
revived again in Bulgaria that the Allies would now no longer hesitate to bomb
for fear of killing Jews. In the end the Jews of Bulgaria escaped not only
deportation to Auschwitz but also the bombing, which left much of Sofia’s
Jewish quarter in ruins.